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Abstract4
In this paper, we extend the framework of Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002) to the case5
of moral hazard. Risk-averse consumers, who can influence the likelihood of states of6
nature by undertaking a hidden action, receive insurance by voluntarily participating7
in a pool of promises of deliveries of future uncertain endowments. In exchange, they8
gain the right to receive a share of the total return of the pool, in proportion to their9
promises. We first analyze the equilibrium properties of the model and then illustrate10
how an aggregate pool of promises of heterogenous consumers, differing in expected11
endowment, results in a welfare improvement over the two segregated pools.12
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1 Introduction15
In this paper, we study a model in which risk-averse consumers face uncertain endowments.16
Consumers can influence the likelihood of the states of nature by undertaking a costly action.17
Since the action is unverifiable, there is moral hazard. Contrary to the traditional literature18
on insurance with moral hazard (see e.g. Arnott and Stiglitz 1988), we do not consider19
that consumers buy insurance contracts from perfectly competitive insurance companies.20
Instead, we assume that consumers commit to contribute a fraction of their endowments to21
a common pool, and, therefore, gain the right to receive a fraction of the total return of the22
pool proportional to their promises.23
In particular, and as in Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002), consumers take the return of the24
pool as given and they are free to choose how much to promise to the pool. This feature allows25
for the possibility that consumers, although equal ex-ante, choose to promise differently, and,26
as a consequence, choose different actions. We verify that this possibility actually occurs,27
∗This paper has previously circulated under the title “Pooling and redistribution with moral hazard”.
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as well as other possible equilibrium configurations in which all consumers make the same28
choice of action and promise. Additionally, we consider the case of ex-ante heterogeneous29
consumers, where one type of consumers has higher expected endowments than the other,30
conditional on choosing the same action. In this case, it could be conjectured that the31
wealthiest would prefer a pool only among themselves rather then a pool together with the32
poorest ones, as the latter would lower the pool’s return. However, we provide an example33
showing that the wealthiest consumers have no loss in welfare by joining a pool to! gether34
with the poorest ones, while the latter are better off. The crucial feature of this result relies on35
moral hazard, that is, on the possibility of influencing the value of expected endowments by36
choosing different actions. In the aggregate pool, the proportion of the wealthiest consumers37
choosing an action which positively affects the return of the pool is increased. This example38
illustrates how such a pool of voluntary promises can be used for redistribution purposes,39
as opposed to compulsory systems. This is a crucial feature of our model in contrast with40
other contributions that consider mutual arrangements in which participants have to pay a41
uniform contribution to the pool, see e.g. Guinnane and Streb (2011).42
The framework first proposed by Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002) had, as its main purpose,43
to overcome the problem of existence of equilibrium in the competitive model with adverse44
selection of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Other authors, since that time, have been ex-45
tending and applying their framework but most consider setups with adverse selection (see,46
among others, Martin (2007) and Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008)). To our knowledge our47
contribution is the first to consider a pool of promises as a means of insurance in the presence48
of moral hazard. In particular, we identify an equilibrium where ex-ante equal consumers49
end up choosing different actions and different consumption bundles, even though they are50
equivalent in terms of utility. This feature enables redistribution among consumers even51
when they are ex-ante heterogenous, a case that we also consider.52
Our paper is set out as follows: in section 2, we introduce the model; in section 3, we53
present our results, illustrate them through examples, and discuss their main implications.54
2 The model55
We consider a pure exchange economy with a single consumption good. The economy is56
populated by a large number of ex-ante identical consumers, and it lasts for two periods57
t = 0, 1. At t = 0 there is no consumption, and at t = 1 each consumer has verifiable58
endowments that depend on a state of nature. There are two possible states s = G,B, and59
we let w = (wG, wB) ∈ R2+ denote the vector of endowment, with wG > wB > 0.60
Consumers may influence the likelihood of states of nature by undertaking an action61
a ∈ A = {L,H}, which is not verifiable, and thus information is asymmetric. Let pia denote62
the probability of the state G when action a is chosen, with 1 > piH > piL > 0 . The63
(dis)utility of the action is ca , and we assume cH > cL = 0. The tradeoff is thus clear: on64
the one hand, undertaking action H increases the likelihood of the state G where endowment65
is higher but, on the other hand, it is costly since it requires higher effort.66
Preferences are represented by an expected utility function U(x, a) : R2+×A → R, which67
depends on a state contingent consumption bundle x = (xG, xB) ∈ R2+ and action as follows:68
U(x, a) := piau(xG) + (1− pia)u(xB)− ca , (1)
with u twice differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave.69
2
2.1 The pool of promises70
Since consumers are risk-averse, they prefer to smooth their consumption across idiosyncratic71
states. This can be accomplished by pooling the risk associated with individual endowments.72
Indeed, we assume that each consumer faces uncertainty independently of other consumers.73
This assumption, in addition to the fact that there is a large number of consumers, rules out74
aggregated uncertainty.75
Inspired by Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002), we propose the following insurance mecha-76
nism: at t = 0, each consumer voluntarily promises to make a delivery to a common pool,77
proportional to his endowment at t = 1. In exchange, at t = 1, the consumer receives a78
share of the total resources of the pool in proportion to his promise, and not to his actual79
delivery. More precisely, suppose that a fraction q of consumers choose a = H and promise80
θH , while a fraction 1− q choose a = L and promise θL. In this case, total deliveries to the81
pool equal qθHw¯H + (1− q)θLw¯L, where w¯a = piawG + (1− pia)wB is the average (aggregate)82
endowment when action a is undertaken. Obviously, probabilities, and hence the fraction83
of consumers in each state, depend on the action chosen by consumers. Let κ denote the84
return per promise, given by:85
κ =
qθHw¯H + (1− q)θLw¯L
qθH + (1− q)θL . (2)
Note that, since all consumers participate in the pool, the idiosyncratic uncertainty is wiped86
out, hence κ is not state contingent. Additionally, (2) implies that wB < w¯L 6 κ 6 w¯H < wG,87
and therefore that net deliveries to the pool θa(ws − κ) are positive for consumers in the88
good state of nature, and negative for consumers in the bad state, irrespective of the action89
chosen. Indeed, state contingent consumption bundles are given by:90
xs = ws − θ(ws − κ), (3)
with s = G,B. Hence, consumers in state G consume less than their endowment, while those91
in state B consume more than their endowment. Therefore, the pool actually works as an92
insurance mechanism.93
2.2 Consumers’ problem94
Consumers take the return per promise κ as given and choose their promises and actions so95
as to maximize expected utility. Formally, the consumers’ problem can be written as follows:96
max
θ∈Θ,a∈A
v(θ, a) = piau(wG − θ(wG − κ)) + (1− pia)u(wB − θ(wB − κ))− ca, (4)
where we have replaced (3) into (1), with Θ = [0, θ¯], and θ¯ = wG/(wG − κ) being the97
maximum value θ can take to ensure a non-negative xG. In what follows, ψ(κ) ⊂ Θ × A98
denotes the set of solutions to problem (4). It is easy to verify that ψ(κ) is not empty.99
Note that 0 6 θ implies xG 6 wG, and therefore negative insurance is ruled out. More-100
over, since θ¯ > 1, overinsurance, that is xB > xG, is admitted. Also, state-contingent con-101
sumption levels are always non-negative. Indeed, θ 6 θ¯ implies xG > 0, and since wB < κ,102
θ > 0 also implies xB > 0.103
3
3 Results and discussion104
In equilibrium, consumers maximize their utility by taking as given the return of the pool,105
which is endogenously determined in a consistent way. Therefore, we propose the following106
definition of equilibrium:107
Definition 3.1. An equilibrium with a pool of promises is (θ˜, a˜, q˜, κ˜) such that:108
1. (θ˜, a˜) ∈ ψ(κ˜) ,109
2. κ˜ satisfies (2) ,110
3. q˜ satisfies:
(a) q˜ = 0 if (θ˜, a˜) ∈ ψ(κ˜) implies a˜ = L , (Action L Equilibrium)
(b) q˜ = 1 if (θ˜, a˜) ∈ ψ(κ˜) implies a˜ = H , (Action H Equilibrium)
(c) q˜ ∈ (0, 1) otherwise . (Mixed Action Equilibrium)
The above definition states that the equilibrium values of q must be properly related to the111
optimal choices of consumers. In particular, q = 0 (q = 1) can only arise in equilibrium if112
a = L (a = H) is the optimal choice for every consumer. Similarly, for q ∈ (0, 1) to arise113
in equilibrium, both a = H and a = L must be optimal choices of consumers. In what114
follows, we first show that an action H equilibrium never arises (Proposition 1), and then we115
propose conditions for the existence of both the action L equilibrium and the mixed action116
equilibrium (Propositions 2 and 3, respectively).117
Proposition 1. [Impossibility of a high cost action equilibrium]118
There cannot be an equilibrium in which all consumers undertake the action H, i.e. , if119
(θ˜, H, q˜, κ˜) is an equilibrium, then q˜ 6= 1.120
Proof. Let φ(κ, a) ⊂ Θ denote the solution set of maxθ∈Θ v(θ, a), and χ(κ, θ) ⊂ A the121
solution set of maxa∈A v(θ, a). Both φ(κ, a) and χ(κ, θ) are non empty and φ(κ, a) is a122
singleton, because of the strict concavity of u. Notice that (θ˜, a˜) ∈ ψ(κ) implies θ˜ = φ(κ, a˜)123
and a˜ ∈ χ(κ, θ˜). Now, suppose, by way of obtaining a contradiction, that q˜ = 1. In this case,124
(2) implies κ = w¯H . If (θ˜, H) is an equilibrium choice, then (θ˜, H) ∈ ψ(w¯H). This implies, in125
particular, H ∈ χ(w¯H , θ˜) and, therefore, v(θ˜, H) > v(θ˜, L). Moreover, (θ˜, H) ∈ ψ(w¯H) also126
implies θ˜ = φ(w¯H , H) and, therefore, θ˜ = 1.! In this case, however, v(θ˜, L) > v(θ˜, H), which127
is the desired contradiction.128
Proposition 1 states that if q = 1 and a = H, then κ does not satisfy (2). Indeed, if consumers129
anticipate the high return per promise κ = w¯H , which is implied by q = 1, their optimal130
choice is actually to over insure themselves and to choose a = L. In the next proposition,131
we state the condition under which action L equilibrium exists.132
Proposition 2. [Possibility of a low cost action equilibrium]133
Let θˆH = φ(w¯L, H) and θˆL = φ(w¯L, L) be the consumers’ optimal promises when κ = w¯L134
conditional on choosing, respectively, a = H and a = L. If v(θˆL, L) ≥ v(θˆH , H), then a low135
action equilibrium exists.136
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Proof. φ(κ, a) is introduced in Proposition 1. When q = 0, (2) implies κ = w¯L. If κ = w¯L,137
then consumers’ optimal promise is θˆL when a = L and θˆH when a = H. If (θˆL, L) is138
preferred to (θˆH , H), then indeed every consumer will choose a = L and hence q = 0.139
Proposition 2 states that if all consumers choose a = L, then κ satisfies (2) and, thus, it140
identifies a possible equilibrium. However, we are also interested in the possibility of a mixed141
action equilibrium. Yet, since consumers are ex-ante equal, this can only happen if they are142
all indifferent to undertaking action H or action L. Proposition 3 states the condition under143
which this happens.144
Proposition 3. [Possibility of a mixed action equilibrium]145
If v(θˆL, L) < v(θˆH , H) , then a mixed action equilibrium exists.146
Proof. When v(θˆL, L) < v(θˆH , H), by adapting lemma 3.2 in Hellwig (1983) it is possible to147
show that there exist κˆ ∈ (w¯L, w¯H), θH < 1 and θL > 1 such that ψ(kˆ) = {(θH , H), (θL, L)}.148
In this case, by definition of equilibrium it must be that κˆ satisfies (2) and q ∈ (0, 1). From149
(2) we get:150
q =
[
1 +
θH (κˆ− w¯H)
θL (w¯L − κˆ)
]−1
.
Since w¯L < κˆ < w¯H , we immediately verify that q ∈ (0, 1) .151
Proposition 3 says that there exists κˆ such that consumers are indifferent between either152
action H or L when choosing two different promises. In this case, they split into the two153
actions in the proportion q ∈ (0, 1) required to ensure that kˆ satisfies (2).154
Figure 1, inspired by Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002), illustrates a mixed action equilib-155
rium. The initial contingent endowments are (wG, 0). Indifference curves are steeper when156
a = H than when a = L. Therefore, they cross below the certainty line and make a kink.1157
Combining the two state contingent consumption levels, as given by (3), with a view to158
eliminating θ, we can relate xB and xG as follows:159
xB =
(wG − wB)κ
wG − κ −
(
κ− wB
wG − κ
)
xG. (5)
This equation shows that, by giving up (wG − κ) units of consumption in the state G, a160
consumer gets (κ − wB) units of consumption in the state B. In Figure 1, we plot three161
downward sloping lines corresponding to (5) when κ = κ¯, κˆ, κ, where κ¯ = w¯H , κ = w¯L, and162
κˆ is the value emerging in a mixed action equilibrium (Proposition 3).163
Alternatively, we can relate the consumers’ state contingent consumption levels, as given164
by (3), by eliminating κ:165
xB = xG − (wG − wB)(1− θ). (6)
This equation shows how much is left over for consumption in the bad state of nature for a166
promise θ . In particular, when θ = 1, then xG = xB, and when θ < 1 (θ > 1), then xG > xB167
(xG < xB). In Figure 1 we plot two of these curves: one associated with the action H168
promise; and the other associated with the action L promise. These are the upward sloping169
1The locus of points where indifference curves corresponding to the same utility level cross is sometimes
called the switching locus.
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Figure 1: Mixed action equilibrium
curves, respectively below and above the 45◦ line. The mixed action equilibrium admissible170
consumption bundles are those at the intersection of the two lines identified by equations171
(5) and (6).172
3.1 Examples of mixed action equilibria173
We present three specific examples of mixed pools of promises. In the first two, we illustrate174
how mixed action equilibria appear. The third example aims to show the Pareto dominance175
of a mixed pool of promises among rich and poor individuals when compared to the two176
segregated pools of rich on the one side and poor individuals on the other.177
Example 1: Let u(x) = log(x), w = (1.5, 0), cH = 0.21, and (piH , piL) = (2/3, 1/3). In178
the mixed action equilibrium, κˆ = 0.52 and qˆ = 0.1. In this case, ψ(kˆ) = {(0.51, H), (1.02, L)}.179
The level of utility achieved is v(θH , H) = v(θL, L) = −0.65, where θH = 0.51 and θL = 1.02.180
Example 2: Let u(x) = xγ/γ with γ = 0.5, w = (1, 0), cH = 0.163, and (piH , piL) = (2/181
3, 1/3). In the mixed action equilibrium, κˆ = 0.4 and qˆ = 0.56. In this case, ψ(kˆ) =182
{(0.23, H), (1.21, L)}. The level of utility achieved is v(θH , H) = v(θL, L) = 1.27, where183
θH = 0.23 and θL = 1.21.184
Example 3: Suppose there exist two equally sized groups of poor (P) and rich (R)185
consumers, with contingent endowments equal to, respectively, wP = (1.5, 0) and wR =186
(2, 0). Furthermore, we assume that, for individuals in both groups, u(x) = log(x), and187
(piH , piL) = (2/3, 1/3). Finally, while we maintain c
R
L = c
P
L = 0, we assume that it is less188
costly for the rich to undertake a = H: cRH = 0.2 and c
P
H = 0.21. This assumption is natural189
when interpreted in terms of a better education that wealthier people receive in preventing190
health accidents (see Smith 1999 for a survey on the relation between wealth and health191
outcomes, and Case et al. 2002 and Currie 2009, which explore empirically the direction of192
the causality).193
Consider first isolated pools of rich and poor individuals. Poor consumers alone face the194
same problem as in example 1 and, therefore, the same mixed action equilibrium emerges. On195
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the other hand, the pool of rich consumers generates the following mixed action equilibrium:196
q = 0.1, κˆ = 0.7, and ψ(kˆ) = {(0.51, H), (1.02, L)}. Rich consumers achieve higher utility:197
v(θH , H) = v(θL, L) = −0.35, where θH = 0.51 and θL = 1.02.198
We now consider the possibility that the two groups form a common pool. Let qR and qP199
denote the proportion of rich and poor consumers choosing a = H. Moreover, we distinguish200
promises made by poor (θP) and rich (θR) consumers. On the other hand, both types of201
consumers benefit from the same return per promise from the common pool. As the two202
groups of consumers are of equal size, it is clear that the return per promise in this case is:203
κ =
∑
i q
iθiHw¯
i
H +
∑
i(1− qi)θiLw¯iL∑
i q
iθiH +
∑
i(1− qi)θiL
, (7)
where i = R,P .2 In this case, a mixed action equilibrium is characterized by qP = 0,204
qR = 0.8, κˆ = 0.7, i.e., the return per promise is as high as the one of the pool of the205
rich alone, but higher than the return per promise of the pool of the poor alone. Moreover,206
ψP(kˆ) = {(1.25, L)} and ψR(kˆ) = {(0.51, H), (1.02, L)}. Facing the same return per promise,207
the rich have no reason to choose differently, and therefore end up with the same level of208
utility. The poor consumers, on the other hand, face a higher return per promise, and,209
therefore, they promise more than when forming a pool of promises alone as in example 1:210
v(θP , L) = −0.32, where θP = 1.25.211
The economy therefore gains from two different effects. Firstly, rich consumers are more212
active in preventing the bad state of nature, and this process increases the aggregate expected213
endowments. Secondly, rich consumers bear a lower cost in preventing the bad state of nature214
and this reduces the economy’s overall cost of preventing accidents. In other words, the rich215
can, at no cost, redistribute towards the poor because they are wealthier and are more able216
to prevent bad outcomes.217
3.2 Discussion218
We analyze the pool of promises in a setting with ex-ante moral hazard, in which agents219
affect the probability distribution of events. This additional freedom allows that, besides the220
low effort equilibrium, it is also possible that economies end up in a mixed action equilibrium221
with some consumers undertaking action H. When a heterogeneous population is considered,222
we show how the rich, who are also more able, can redistribute towards the poor at no cost,223
i.e., the heterogenous pool Pareto dominates the two segregated pools.224
The implementation of a mixed equilibrium is a natural question to raise. One can225
think of a pool organizer as allocating consumers to promise levels according to the q that226
guarantees a consistent return per promise. Again, consumers are completely indifferent to227
this process since, whatever their action, they end up with the same level of utility.228
In our view this framework is of particular interest in developing countries. As Pauly229
et al 2006 suggest, it seems reasonable to think of insurance cooperatives as an adequate230
form of insurance organization for these countries. In fact, on the one hand, tax systems231
are often more deficient, which compromises a compulsory public insurance scheme. On the232
other hand, the population of these countries is poorer and more often excluded from the233
market. In developing countries, mutual insurance solutions have indeed emerged for smaller234
2See the Appendix for the analytical derivation of the equilibrium of the pool of promises among rich and
poor individuals.
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communities. For example, Cabrales et al (2003) analyze a specific mutual fire insurance235
scheme used in Andorra, De Weerdt and Dercon (2006) find evidence of risk-sharing across236
networks within a village of Tanzania, and Murgai et al (2002) study water transfers along237
two water courses in Pakistan. Additionally, we argue that a voluntary mutual insurance238
scheme, such as the pool of promises, could be implemented at the national level.239
However, for an application to developing economies, it seems reasonable to extend this240
model so that it encompasses aggregate uncertainty. Another interesting extension is to241
consider the possibility of limiting promises. Limiting promises has the same effect that242
partial insurance has in standard models of moral hazard: it makes incentive compatible243
a high cost action enhancing consumers’ welfare. However, in a heterogenous pool, the244
consequences of limiting promises are not as straightforward.245
Appendix246
Let λR and λP denote, respectively, the proportion of rich and poor consumers, with247
λR + λP = 1 . Moreover, let w¯R and w¯P be the expected endowments of, respectively,248
the former and the latter, with w¯R > w¯P . Note that the total expected endowments that249
an aggregate pool can guarantee to its members (λRw¯R + λPw¯P ) is lower than w¯R , the250
expected endowment a segregated pool of rich alone can guarantee to its members.251
When an aggregated pool is formed, its return per promise depends on the deliveries of252
both types of consumers as follows:253
κ =
∑
i λ
iqiθiHw¯
i
H +
∑
i λ
i(1− qi)θiLw¯iL∑
i λ
iqiθiH +
∑
i λ
i(1− qi)θiL
. (8)
We propose the following definition of equilibrium of the aggregated pool:254
Definition 3.2. An equilibrium with aggregate pool of promises is (θ˜i, a˜i, q˜i, κ˜), such that,255
for i ∈ {P ,R}:256
(1) (θ˜i, a˜i) ∈ ψi(κ˜) ,257
(2) κ˜ satisfies (8) ,258
(3) q˜i satisfies:259
(a) q˜i = 0 if (θ˜i, a˜i) ∈ ψi(κ˜) ⇒ a˜i = L, ∀i ,260
(b) q˜i = 1 if (θ˜i, a˜i) ∈ ψi(κ˜) ⇒ a˜i = H ∀i ,261
(c) q˜i ∈ (0, 1) otherwise .262
In the case of the heterogeneous pool of promises, an equilibrium with a mixed (aggregate)263
pool of promises is such that q =
∑
i λ
iqi ∈ (0, 1). Also let κˆi represent the critical return264
per promise of group i ∈ {P ,R} above (below) which type i consumers choose to do action265
L (H). It is straightforward to check that κˆ is increasing in endowment, for u(x) = log(x),266
as used in examples 1 and 3. Thus, κˆR > κˆP . Consequently, considering a candidate267
equilibrium κ , one of the following configurations may occur:268
1. κˆP < κˆR < κ , and both poor and rich choose action L. Hence, q = 0.269
2. κˆP < κˆR = κ , and poor choose action L while rich are indifferent. Hence, qP = 0,270
qR ∈ (0, 1), and q ∈ (0, 1).271
3. κˆP < κ < κˆR , and poor choose action L while rich choose action H. Hence, qP = 0,272
qR = 1, and q ∈ (0, 1).273
8
4. κˆP = κ < κˆR , and poor are indifferent while rich choose action H. Hence, qP ∈ (0, 1),274
qR = 1, and q ∈ (0, 1).275
5. κ < κˆP < κˆR , and both poor and rich choose action H. Hence, q = 1.276
Note that case 5 can never arise in equilibrium, as follows from Proposition 1. In the text277
we illustrate case 2 type of equilibrium.278
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